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Abstract
This Article discusses the application of European competition law to standardization ac-
tivities and associated Intellectual Property Rights (“IPR”) Policies and licensing arrangements.
It briefly discusses the objectives of standardization activities in Europe and contains a general
introduction into relevant principles of European Community (“EC”) competition law. This is fol-
lowed by a review of principles and antitrust case law relating to: (a) restrictions on membership
and access to the standardization process; (b) possible spill-over effects; (c) standard depth and
over-standardization; (d) selection of technology for standards; (e) access to standards information
and essential IPRs; (f) IPR Policies and problems associated with non-disclosure, late disclosure,
or incomplete disclosure of essential patents; and (g) compulsory licensing of essential IPRs under
Articles 81(3) (ex Article 85(3)) and 82 (ex Article 86) of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community (“EC Treaty”), and disputes concerning royalties and licensing terms in a standards
environment. Some standards for standards appear at the end of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses the application of European competi-
tion law to standardization activities and associated Intellectual
Property Rights ("IPR") Policies and licensing arrangements. It
briefly discusses the objectives of standardization activities in Eu-
rope and contains a general introduction into relevant princi-
ples of European Community ("EC") competition law. This is
followed by a review of principles and antitrust case law relating
to: (a) restrictions on membership and access to the standardi-
zation process; (b) possible spill-over effects; (c) standard depth
and over-standardization; (d) selection of technology for stan-
dards; (e) access to standards information and essential IPRs; (f)
IPR Policies and problems associated with non-disclosure, late
disclosure, or incomplete disclosure of essential patents; and (g)
compulsory licensing of essential IPRs under Articles 81(3) (ex
Article 85(3)) and 82 (ex Article 86) of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community ("EC Treaty")', and disputes concern-
ing royalties and licensing terms in a standards environment.
Some standards for standards appear at the end of this Article.
I. SOURCES OF STANDARDS IN EUROPE
While this Article concentrates on private standard-setting
* Maurits Dolmans is a partner in the Brussels office of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen &
Hamilton. He received his Master of Laws from Rijksuniversiteit Leiden and his L.L.M.
from Columbia University. This Article was originally a paper for the American Bar
Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Spring meeting 2002, Session on Trade Associa-
tions, Washington DC, April 26, 2002, and for the joint Department of Justice Antitrust
Division/Federal Trade EC Commission hearings on Competition and Intellectual
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, Session on Comparative
Law Topics: Licensing of Intellectual Property in Other Jurisdictions, Washington DC,
May 22, 2002.
1. Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ.
C 340/3, at 208-09 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 71 [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty], incor-
porating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union,
the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2,
1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997) (amending Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), Treaty es-
tablishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"), Treaty establishing the European
Coal and Steel Community, and Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
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organizations ("SSO"), standards may be developed by a number
of sources, and precedents relating to one category may be rele-
vant to others as well. The various standards categories are: (a)
single-firm de facto standards;2 (b) multi-firm commercial stan-
dards, developed by trade associations or ad hoc standards orga-
nizations, often leading to a patent pool;3 (c) formal commercial
standards bodies with mixed membership;4 and (d) government
standards.5
2. See The Community v. IBM, [1984] C.M.L.R. 147 (discussing 1984 IBM under-
taking); Commission Decision No. 89/113/EEC, O.J. L 43/27 (1989) (Decca Navigator
System); see also Commission Press Release, IP/00/906 (Aug. 3, 2000) and Commission
Press Release IP/01/1232 (Aug. 30, 2001) (both discussing currently pending Euro-
pean Microsoft cases, which concern client-to-server Operating Systems ("OS"), OS to
middleware, and server-to-server OS interoperability). According to the European
Community Commission ("EC Commission"), the IMS Health case would be another
example, although this is disputed. See Commission Decision No. 2001/165/EC, O.J. L
59/18 (2001) ("IMS Health"), suspended sub nom, IMS Health Inc. v. Commission, Case
T-184/01, [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 2, suspension confirmed sub nom, NDC Health Corp. v. IMS
Health Inc. and Commission, Case C-481/01, [2002] 5 C.M.L.R. 1, prelim. hr'g sub nom,
IMS Health Inc. v. NDC Health Corp., Case C-418/01 (ECJ May 1, 2002) (not yet re-
ported) [hereinafter IMS Health].
3. See Commission Decision No. 87/69/EEC, O.J. L 35/36 (1987) (X-Open
Group); Commission Decision No. 91/C220/03, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Aug. 23, 1990),
cited in O.J. C 220/2 (1991) (Philips/Matsushita-D2B); Commission Decision No. 92/
C333/04, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Dec. 17, 1992), cited in OJ. C 333/8 (1992) (Philips/
Matsushita DCC); Commission Decision No. 78/156/EEC, OJ. L 47/42 (1978) (Philips
VCR); Commission Press Release, IP/98/353 (Apr. 15, 1998); Commission Decision
No. 98/C229/06, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Jul. 22, 1991), cited in O.J. C 229/19 (1998)
(MPEG-2); Commission Press Release IP/98/1155 (Dec. 18, 1998); Commission Press
Release IP/00/1135 (Oct. 9, 2000); see also Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assist. Atty.
Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Gerrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell Uun. 26,
1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/1170.htm; Letter from
Joel I. Klein, Acting Assist. Atty. Gen., U.S. Dep't ofJustice, to Gerrard R. Beeney, Esq.,
Sullivan & Cromwell (Dec. 16, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
busreview/2121.htm; U.S. Dept. ofJustice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (Apr. 6, 1995), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm (discussing patent pools).
4. See, e.g., European Telecommunications Standards Institute's Intellectual Property Rights
Undertaking ("ETSI IPR Undertaking") (settled, not published) (on file with author); European
Telecommunications Standards Institute/ Digital Voice Systems, Inc. ("ETSI/DVSI") (complaint
rejected, not published) (on file with author).
5. See Council Directive 98/34/EC, O.J. L 204 (1998). There are no competition
cases, but these bodies are subject to Article 86 (ex art. 90), and could be subject to
Articles 10 (ex art. 5) juncto 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (ex arts. 85 and 86). See also
RTT v. GB-Inno-BM SA, Case C-18/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5941. Thus, Member States
must ensure that competition in the EC is not distorted.
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II. OBJECTIVES OF EUROPEAN
STANDARDIZATION ACTIVITIES
When analyzing the competitive impact of a standards
agreement and the availability of an exemption under Article
81 (3), European antitrust. authorities will keep in mind that stan-
dards have several benefits, some of which may differ from U.S.
policy objectives.
A. Market Integration
In the European Economic Area ("EEA"), market integra-
tion is an important policy objective. Article 28 (ex Article 30)
of the EC Treaty provides for the free movement of goods that
were legally marketed elsewhere in the Community.6 Under Ar-
ticle 30 (ex Article 36) of the EC Treaty7 and the case law of the
Court of Justice following Cassis de Dijon,8 however, individual
Member States may bar marketing and imports of products that
do not meet specifications that are necessary to protect
mandatory requirements such as safety, consumer protection, or
the integrity of telecommunications networks.
Where such permissible national standards differ, and espe-
cially where they are incompatible, trade between Member
States is restricted. To eliminate these restrictions, it may be
necessary to set European standards, recognized in all Member
States and replacing incompatible national standards.9 Stan-
dards developed by private SSOs may have similar beneficial ef-
fects, and formal or Government standards may be prepared
within private SSOs.
6. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.6, art. 28, O.J. C 340/3, at 189 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 51 (ex art. 30).
7. Id. art. 30, O.J. C 340/3, at 189 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 51 (ex. Art. 36).
8. See Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fdir Branntwein, Case C-120/
78, [1979] E.C.R. 0649.
9. While in the past such standards were promulgated by EC Council Directives
regulating all relevant details, harmonization directives now tend to set out the essential
requirements to be met, and mandate the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute ("ETSI"), European Committee for Standardization ("CEN"), or European
Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization ("Cenelec") to develop the functional
or design specifications to meet these requirements. Certain standards bodies such as
ETSI include private firms, and agreements in that context are subject to scrutiny under
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.
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B. Economic Efficiencies
Other beneficial effects of standardization, which underlie
many commercial standardization arrangements, are: (a) prod-
uct interoperability and compatibility reducing barriers to entry;
(b) rationalization of production; (c) economies of scale; (d)
creation of network effects needed for the introduction of new
technologies; (e) creation of unified platforms for development
of new products; and (f) research and development ("R&D") ef-
ficiencies.'" Standardization may also allow opportunities for
small and medium enterprises. In Europe, the Global System for
Mobile Telecommunications ("GSM") is often cited as a model
for beneficial standardization.
III. GENERAL INTRODUCTION OF EUROPEAN ANTITRUST
LAW RELEVANT FOR STANDARDS
A. Article 81
Article 81(1) prohibits agreements or arrangements be-
tween undertakings that may affect trade between EC Member
States, and that have as their object or effect the prevention, re-
striction, or distortion of competition within the common mar-
ket. The restriction of competition must be appreciable. Arti-
cle 81(2) provides that restrictions in such agreements are auto-
matically void." Article 81(3) permits the EC Commission of
the European Communities (the "EC Commission") to exempt
restrictive agreements that might otherwise be prohibited, if: (a)
they foster technical or economic progress; (b) they are indis-
pensable to achieve such progress; (c) they benefit consumers;
or (d) they do not completely exclude competition.
Broad exemptions under Article 81(3) are contained in
block exemption regulations.12 Standardization, therefore, will
often be automatically exempted if the joint market share is less
than 25%, and if the agreement meets the conditions of the
10. See generally, GM Peter Swann, The Economics of Standardization: Final Report for
Standards and Technical Regulations Directorate Department of Trade and Industry (study for
the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry), available at http://
www.dti.gov.uk/strd/fundingo.htm#swannrep.
11. If under applicable contract law the restrictive terms of the contract are severa-
ble, only the restrictive terms are void.
12. Commission Regulation No. 2659/2000, O.J. L 304/7 (2000) (discussing cate-
gories ofjoint research and development ("R&D") agreements that may be relevant for
standardization).
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joint R&D block exemption regulation.' 3 If the standardization
concerns an entirely new product, or a product in which none of
the participating companies compete, the block exemption is
available even above the 25% ceiling for the duration of the stan-
dard setting and seven years thereafter.14
Until the introduction of the "modernization" of European
antitrust law, expected in 2004, standardization and pooling may
also be exempted by individual exemption decisions or comfort
letters following a formal notification process.
1 5
B. The Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements
The EC Commission has recently adopted Guidelines on
the applicability of Article 81 to horizontal cooperation agree-
ments ("Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements" or "Guide-
lines").16 These include general principles applicable to stand-
ardization agreements, defined for the purpose of the Guide-
lines on Horizontal Agreements as agreements which have as
their primary objective the definition of technical or quality re-
quirements with which current or future products, production
processes, or methods may comply.1 7 Similar principles may ap-
ply to the terms of access to a particular quality or compliance
mark.
According to the Guidelines, standards that have only "neg-
ligible coverage of the relevant market" are not caught by Article
81, so long as they remain de minimis, and the associated agree-
13. Article 2(4) defines "research and development" as "the acquisition of know-
how relating to products .. . and the carrying out of theoretical analysis, systematic
study or experimentation, including experimental production, technical testing of
product or processes, the establishment of the necessary facilities and the obtaining of
intellectual property rights for the results." See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra n.6, art. 2
(4), O.J. C 340/3, at 181 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 43 (ex art. 30). This is broad enough.to
encompass many standardization programs.
14. Commission Regulation No. 2659/2000, O.J. L 304/7 (2000).
15. See Press release IP/00/[064 (referencing Council Regulation on the Imple-
mentation of the Rules on Competition, laid down in Articles 81 and 82 and amending
Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 2988/74, (EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) No
3975/87, COM (2000) 582 Final (Sept. 2000)). The Commission Proposal discussed
the modernization proposals; the elimination of the notification process and ex ante
review; and the goal of empowering of national courts and competition authorities to
apply Article 81(3) directly.
16. Commission Notice, O.J. C 3/2 (2001) [hereinafter Guidelines].
17. See id. at 24, para. 159. Standardization may involve joint research and devel-
opment.
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ments do not include per se violations such as price fixing or out-
put restrictions. 8 A joint market share threshold of less than
10% can be used as a rule of thumb. 19
Standardization agreements involving firms with a joint
market share above 10% may still escape Article 81 (1) if they are
based on non-discriminatory, open, and transparent procedures,
provided that such agreements do not oblige manufacturers to
comply with the standard or if they do mandate compliance, are
"parts of a wider agreement to ensure compatibility of prod-
uctS.
' 2 0
Conversely, standards agreements would likely be prohib-
ited if they "use a standard as a means among other parts of a
broader restrictive agreement aimed at excluding actual or po-
tential competitors." 21
Article 81(1) may, in addition, prohibit standardization
agreements that limit product differentiation by discouraging or
eliminating innovation, or giving competitors control over each
other's production or innovation.22 This applies in particular to
agreements that prevent participants or third parties from devel-
oping alternative standards or selling products that do not com-
ply with the standards, or agreements that prevent certain manu-
facturers from implementing the standard.23
Even if a standardization agreement restricts competition, it
may benefit from an exemption under Article 81(3).24 The EC
18. Id. at 24, para. 164.
19. Commission Notice, OJ. C 368/13 (2001) [hereinafter Agreements ofMinor Im-
portance]. The threshold for the enforcement of EC competition law with respect to
horizontal agreements between competitors is a joint market share of 10%. Several
markets could be relevant for the analysis of standards agreements including (a) the
products being standardized or to be replaced by the standardized product; (b) the
service market for standardization; (c) the service market for testing and certification;
(d) the market for technology necessary for the implementation of the standard; and
(e) innovation markets.
20. Guidelines, O.J. C 3/2, at 24, para. 163 (2001).
21. Id. at 24, para. 165.
22. Id. at 24, para. 166.
23. Id. at 24, para. 167.
24. In the case of standardization agreements and vertical agreements, if issues
arise, notification can be made, and exemption can be issued with retroactive effect. See
Commission Regulation No. 17, art. 4(2)(3)(a), which provides that the EC Commis-
sion may grant exemptions for agreements that have as their "sole" object the develop-
ment of uniform application of standards or types, even if these agreements have not
been notified. The same applies for license agreements. See id. art. 4(2) (a) as amended
by Council Regulation No. 1216/1999/EC (amending Commission Regulation No. 17,
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Commission made it clear that it "generally takes a positive ap-
proach towards agreements that promote economic interpene-
tration in the common market or encourage the development of
new markets and improved supply conditions. 25
This positive attitude is dependent on a finding that an ap-
preciable proportion of the industry is involved in the setting of
the standard in a transparent manner, 26 and that the agreements
contain no restrictions of competition that are not indispensable
to achieve the reasonable objectives of the standard, such as un-
necessary restrictions on innovation.27 Moreover, the necessary
information to apply the standards must be available to those
wishing to enter the market. 28
C. Article 82
Article 82 bans abuses of a dominant position in a substan-
tial part of the common market. The threshold question for the
application of this Article is the existence of a dominant posi-
tion. Article 82 would in most cases not apply to the trade associ-
ation developing the standard (although standards bodies could
be found dominant in the service markets for standardization,
testing, and certification). Should the standard become success-
ful, however, manufacturers of compliant products may become
dependent on the underlying technology. If the technology pro-
vider is found dominant, Article 82 would impose certain limita-
tions on the exercise of its IPRs or contractual rights. In particu-
lar, dominant technology suppliers must not exercise their rights
in a discriminatory fashion or with a view to creating or main-
taining barriers to entry in a downstream market (the market for
compliant products).
Technology suppliers with a dominant position must not en-
gage in excessive pricing, discrimination, exclusionary practices,
or retaliation against competitors. They may be required to li-
OJ. L 148/5 (1999)). Regulation 17/62 will be superseded by a new directive that will
very likely eliminate the possibility of notifying agreement for ex ante exemption.
25. Guidelines, O.J. C 3/2, at 25; para. 169 (2001).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 25, para. 173. The EC Commission recognizes in the Guidelines on Hori-
zontal Agreements that it may be necessary in some cases to select a particular technol-
ogy as a platform or framework for a standard, provided that the choice is justifiable
and made through an open process. See id. at 25, para. 17.
28. Id. at 25, para. 169.
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cense IPRs against their will, but only in exceptional circum-
stances.2 ' The EC Commission has indicated that if a standard
had been adopted, implemented, and made mandatory by a
Community instrument, a refusal to license the technology nec-
essary to use the standard would raise serious questions under
Article 82.30 This does not, however, apply to technology that is
not "essential" for a standard, even if that technology gives the
user a competitive advantage in the standardized environment.
IV. COMPETITION ISSUES
The Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements are a mere intro-
duction, and do not provide a full overview of antitrust law as
applied to SSOs. A number of competition concerns arise in
connection with multilateral standardization, which can be
grouped as follows: (a) restrictions on access to the standardiza-
tion process (and requirements to license future IPRs as a condi-
tion for participation) ;31 (b) spill-over effects ("horse-trading",
information exchange, platform for collusion);32 (c) reduction
of product differentiation (over-standardization) ;33 (d) open
and objective selection of technology (and possible misuse of IP
policy to influence technology choice); 34 (e) access to quality
mark (entrusting specific bodies with exclusive rights to test
compliance with the standard) ;35 (f) access to standards informa-
tion and essential IPRs;36 and (g) IPR Policies, and access to
technology needed to comply with standards.37
29. See Commission Decision No. 89/205/EEC, O.J. L 78/43 (1989) (Magill). The
EC Commission and the European Courts are currently considering possible compul-
sory licensing in the controversial IMS Health case.
30. EC Commission Communication on IPRs and Standardization, COM 92/445 (1992)
[hereinafter IPR Commission Communication].
31. See Commission Decision No. 87/69/EEC, O.J. L 35/36 (1987) (X-Open
Group); ETSI IPR Undertaking (settled, not published) (on file with author).
32. ETSI/ DVSI (complaint reected, not published) (on file with author).
33. See id. See also Philips VCR, O.J. L 47/42 (1978).
34. See ETSI/DVSI, supra n.32.
35. See Guidelines, O.J. C 3/2, at 24, para. 167 (2001).
36. See X/Open Group, OJ. L 35/36, at 36 (1987); ETSI IPR Undertaking, supra
n.31.
37. See ETSI IPR Undertaking, supra n.31 (discussing various patent pool cases);
Commission Decision No. 89/205/EEC, O.J. L 78/43 (1989) (Magill); IMS Health,
supra n.3.
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A. Open Access to the Standardization Process
1. Principle: Wide Industry Participation Required
The EC Commission's positive attitude towards standards
agreements is dependent on a finding that "an appreciable pro-
portion of the industry is involved in the setting of the standard
in a transparent manner."'38 There are several reasons for this.
First, the benefits of standardization may not be achieved if
the group is too small to create the network effect that a stan-
dard needs in order to succeed. If so, the benefits of standardi-
zation may not outweigh the risk of information exchange and
spillover.
Second, the EC Commission is concerned with maintaining
equality of opportunity in standardized markets. Participants in
the standardization process have the opportunity to influence
the direction of the standard (include their own technology or
exclude their competitors'), obtain in-depth experience with the
standards, and have advance information allowing them to ob-
tain a head start in implementation. This affects competition.
Firms often vie with each other to have their technology in-
cluded in a standard, in order to minimize their cost and maxi-
mize efficiencies of scale and scope (especially if they also make
complementary products). If they succeed, they not only limit
their own cost, but may also raise their rivals' costs, to the extent
the latter have to switch to a new technology and abandon their
own solution. The greater the chances of success of the stan-
dard, and the wider its potential fields of application, the more
important it is to allow equality of opportunity in the standards
setting process.
Finally, collective boycott arrangement excluding particular
(groups of) firms can be inefficient because they limit the availa-
ble pool of knowledge and technology and thus risk creating
lower-quality standards.
2. Limitations on Admission
Commercial standards groups have an incentive to broaden
their membership so as to achieve network effects, but are not
always required to admit everyone.
Small groups of firms may prepare standards en petit comite
38. Guidelines, O.J. C 3/2, at 25, para. 169 (2001).
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by entering into joint R&D agreements in the pre-standardiza-
tion phase, so as to present a joint solution for adoption as a
standard. If the joint market share is less than 10% or the par-
ties are not competitors at all, the agreement is de minimis and
permissible even if the conditions of the joint R&D block exemp-
tion are not met.39 If the parties have explicitly agreed not to
admit outsiders, the arrangements may still be automatically ex-
empted if the joint market share is less than 25% and the agree-
ment meets the conditions of the joint R&D block exemption
regulation, or if the participants do not compete in the area (for
instance, if the product is new). 4o
Limitations on membership of groups with larger market
share may be exempted under Article 81(3) if the selection crite-
ria are necessary, objective, and relevant, and exclusion deci-
sions can be appealed to a neutral panel or court. The EC Com-
mission exempted membership restrictions in X/Open Group on
the grounds that the development of standards for a common
application environment were beneficial for competition, and
that restriction of membership was necessary for practical and
logistical reasons, considering that the standards group might
become bogged down if all industry members were admitted.4
3. Burdensome Conditions for Admission
The more influential the standards body, the more carefully
membership criteria are scrutinized. Important standards orga-
nizations such as the European Telecommunication Standards
Institute ("ETSI")4 2 cannot leverage their position to extract un-
39. See id. at 24, para. 164; see also Agreements of Minor Importance, supra n.19.
40. See Guidelines, O.J. C 3/2, at 24, para. 164 (2001).
41. See O.J. L 35/36, at 36 (1987) (stating that membership is subject to majority
decision, and limited to major manufacturers with UNIX expertise and European pres-
ence); Guidelines, O.J. C 3/2, at 25, para. 172 (2001) (suggesting that parties must
demonstrate that full openness entails "important inefficiencies" and that parties
should provide for "collective representation of interests."). An essential element in
the EC Commission's decision was that the negative effect on competition was reduced
by the group's professed aim of making the results of the cooperation available "as
widely and quickly as possible." The EC Commission also noted that members were not
obligated to implement the standard or to refrain from implementing other standards.
42. The European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations
("CEPT") created ETSI following the EC Commission's recommendation in its 1987
Green Paper on the development of the common market for telecommunications ser-
vices and equipment for the purpose of establishing common European standards in
the telecommunications sector. Contrary to the CEPT, which only had government
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reasonable and unnecessary concessions from their member-
ship, and membership conditions themselves must not lead to
restriction of competition. Thus, for instance, obligations to
share information must remain limited to what is reasonably
necessary and directly related to the standards work, and stan-
dards organizations should avoid membership conditions that
impose general obligations to license IPRs for standards that the
IPR holder does not support.
B. Spill-Over Effects: Information Exchange, Commercial Collusion,
Collective Boycotts, and Market Allocation
Standards agreements would likely be prohibited if they
"use a standard as a means amongst other parts of a broader
restrictive agreement aimed at excluding actual or potential
competitors."44 An early case was a system for equipment ap-
proval by a central heating trade association in Belgium.4" The
trade association members agreed to buy only equipment ap-
proved by the Accreditation Committee. That Committee con-
sisted of Belgian firms that approved only Belgian products, and
refused to approve imported products that also met the stan-
dards. This led to reduced imports without justification, in viola-
tion of Article 81(1).
An exchange of technical information and market data on
user requirements is inherent in the standardization effort. It
need not affect competition, so long as it does not concern
prices, customers, market position, production plans, or other
sensitive market information concerning the products of the
parties.46 Standards groups should adopt antitrust compliance
members, ETSI's members are administrative bodies, public network operators, manu-
factures, users, and others. ETSI is the only European Economic Area ("EEA") organi-
zation to develop technical standards for telecommunications equipment and services.
It is officially recognized as such by the EC, and the EC Commission delegates to ETSI
the task of developing European telecommunications standards. The standards
adopted by ETSI are of both legal and practical importance. See http://www.etsi.org.
43. See, e.g., open letter from the EC Commission to ETSI and CBEMA (Feb. 1994)
(not published) (on file with author) (stating preliminary views on a complaint brought
against ETSI) [hereinafter ETSI Open Letter]. The ETSI Open Letter is discussed in
more detail infta. Part IV, E. Open Access to the Standardization Results and Informa-
tion.
44. Guidelines, O.J. C 3/2, at 24, para. 165 (2001).
45. Commission Decision No. 72/390/EEC, O.J. L 264/22 (1972) (UBIC).
46. In certain cases, however, the joint R&D block exemption may be available for
joint exploitation arrangements, as discussed infra, part IV. A.
2002]
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guidelines and procedures to ensure that their organization is
not used as a platform for collusion.
C. Risk of Overstandardization: Reduction of Product Diversity and
Abuse of Buying Power
Standardization reduces technological variety and may stifle
competition through innovation.47 Consumers may be deprived
of a particular product, attribute, or quality that they may want.
If a standard is binding legally or defacto, what is left is competi-
tion by imitation, essentially on grounds of price and image, and
perhaps some competition on secondary product characteristics.
Even price competition may be diminished, because reduction
of product diversity creates cost commonalities and facilitates
collusion or parallel pricing. Standardization is therefore pro-
hibited by Article 81(1) (b) to the extent that it hinders innova-
tion, freezes a particular stage of technical development, or
blocks the network access of some users or service providers."a
The degree of anticompetitive effect is analyzed on a case-
by-case basis,49 but will in general depend on: (a) the market
share of the participants (see above); (b) any exclusivity agreed
upon between the parties or that may naturally flow from the
desire to reduce costs, to the extent it results in appreciable fore-
closure of outlets for competing technology or standards; and
(c) the standardization depth, to the extent that it prescribes not
only functional specifications, but also design specifications.
47. Guidelines, OJ. C 3/2, at 4, para. 22 (2001) (stating that if standards agree-
ments have negative effects "these are likely to be on innovation or the variety of prod-
ucts. They may also give rise to foreclosure problems").
48. According to the European Directive on a common regulatory framework for
electronic communications networks and services, standards should not be used where
such negative effects are expected. Council Directive No. 2002/21, art. 17(2) and
17(5), Oj. L 108/33, at 45 (2002). The Directive states:
Member States shall encourage the use of the standards and/or specifications
... to the extent strictly necessary to ensure interoperability of services and to
improve freedom of choice for users . . . [and that w]here the Commission
considers that standards and/or specifications... no longer contribute to the
provision of harmonised electronic communications services, or that they no
longer meet consumers' needs or are hampering technological development,
it shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 22(2),
remove them from the list of standards and/or specifications [..
Id. art. 17(2) and 17(5), O.J. L 108/33, at 45 (2002).
49. See Guidelines, O.J. C 3/2, at 25, para. 170 (2001).
STANDARDS FOR STANDARDS
The effect on competition is greater if all product characteris-
tics, or the core of the product, are subjected to standardization.
1. Exclusion of Alternative Compliant Technologies
Standards agreements must not reduce product diversity
any more than is reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate
objectives of the standards.50
For instance, when Philips and Sony entered into an agree-
ment with other VCR producers "on uniform application of
technical standards for the VCR system",5 they agreed on a roy-
alty-free cross-license of patents for the purpose of compatibility
of cassettes with recorders from different vendors, but provided
"unlike the usual type of agreements on standards, for the adop-
tion of the complete system of one of the parties (Philips) by the
other parties. '52 No other systems were allowed. Moreover, no
change could be made to the Philips system without the consent
of all parties. 53 In spite of the improved interoperability of cas-
settes with video machines of different producers, the EC Com-
mission refused exemption on the ground that:
compliance with the VCR standards led to the exclusion of
other, perhaps better, systems. Such an exclusion was partic-
ularly serious in view of the pre-eminent market position en-
joyed by Philips [ . . .54
[R] estrictions were imposed upon the parties which were not
indispensable to the attainment of these improvements. The
compatibility of VCR video cassettes with the machines made
by other manufacturers would have been ensured even if the
latter had to accept no more than an obligation to observe
the VCR standards when manufacturing VCR equipment.55
2. Safeguarding Competition Between Alternative Compliant
Technologies That Have Been Included in
the Standard
When several alternative compliant technologies have been
included in the standard, competition between them must be
50. Id. at 24, para. 167.
51. Philips VCR, O.J. L 47/42, at 43 (1978).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at para. 29.
55. Id. at para. 31.
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maintained to the extent possible. This principle was high-
lighted recently by the EC Commission when giving antitrust
clearance to a set of agreements concerning standard technol-
ogy in the area of third generation ("3G") mobile services.56
The agreements concluded by the 3G Patent Platform Partner-
ship ("3G3P") concerned the IMT-2000 3G standard, compli-
ance with which is required for all manufacturers who want to
produce 3G equipment.57 Since the IMT-2000 standard com-
prises five different alternative technologies, the Commission
was concerned that the agreements would lead to a reduction of
competition between potentially competing essential patents for
these different technologies. The Commission therefore re-
quired the 3G3P, as a condition for clearance, to modify the ini-
tial structure of the agreements and establish five separate sets of
patent licensing arrangements, one for each technology, instead
of combining all essential patents in one single platform.
3. Design Specifications vs. Functional Specifications
Unfortunately, the EC Commission is neither well equipped
nor does it appear to be ready to apply the same principles as
vigorously to formal standards organizations. When the Euro-
pean Telecommunications Standards Institute ("ETSI") devel-
oped the standards for private digital mobile radio communica-
tion ("TETRA"), different technology providers vied to have
their technology used as the basis for the standardized voice
coder/decoder ("codec"). The main choice was between the al-
gorithm and high-level software specifications of the U.S. firm
Digital Voice Systems, Inc. ("DVSI") that could be implemented
in various ways, and the bit-specific software program of France's
Thomson Electronics ("Thomson") that would exclude all
choice of implementation and freeze further development.
Even though objective tests consistently showed that the
DVSI algorithm resulted in better quality products, ETSI se-
lected the latter because DVSI refused to place its software im-
plementation in source code form in the public domain - al-
though the use of its software was not part of the specification of
56. Antitrust clearance for licensing of patents for third generation mobile ser-
vices, Commission Press Release, IP/02/1651 (Nov. 12, 2002).
57. The agreements set up procedures to identify whether a patent is essential, to
streamline the licensing of those patents that are deemed essential, and to reduce the
overall license fees to be paid for the entire portfolio of essential patents.
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the standard, and DVSI was willing to license its code on fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory ("FRAND") terms and con-
ditions to implementers who did not want to write their own
code.5" In these circumstances, the ETSI members arguably mis-
used their collective technology buying power to force DVSI to
make its software public, and to punish it with foreclosure when
DVSI refused to give in to this pressure. The result was selection
of lesser-quality Thomson technology.5
The EC Commission refused to intervene on the grounds
that a bit-specific standard allowed better testing, development
of compatible products, and type approval in this instance. At
the same time, the EC Commission in its letter closing the case
stated that "[i] t is, of course, clear that overstandardization can
have extremely negative effects on market development and
competition: my services have already indicated to ETSI that
ETSI should carefully examine standards and standards proce-
dures in light of any potential impact on competition."
The Guidelines suggest that:
Agreements on standards should cover no more than what is
necessary to ensure their aims, whether this is technical com-
patibility or a certain level of quality. For instance, it should
be very clearly demonstrated why it is indispensable to the
emergence of the economic benefits that an agreement to
disseminate a standard in an industry where only one compet-
itor offers an alternative should oblige the parties to the
agreement to boycott the alternative.60
58. The ETSI Dispute Resolution Report specified:
The standardization bodies are frequently accused of "over-standardizing",
and with justification. Here we have placed ourselves in a position that we are
selecting a single manufacturer's technology... rather than making a consen-
sus between TC participants on a common technology... I am obliged to ask
why it was necessary to publish within the standard the detailed information
when DVSI made the offer to publicly provide about 100-150 pages of specifi-
cations for the TETRA code that could be considered as sufficient information
from a standards point of view and make the very detailed information (C-
source code) available against undertakings, against the background of the
company's business success being dependent upon the retention of its trade
secrets.
See Maurits Dolmans, Restrictions on Innovation, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 455 (1998).
59. DVSI pointed out that there were indications of possible collusion, but no dis-
closure or discovery proceedings existed in Europe, and the EC Commission did not
investigate whether Thomson and others might have illegally coordinated their vote
with a view to exclude DVSI. See ETSI/ DVSI, supra n.32.
60. Guidelines, O.J. C 3/2, at 25, para. 173 (2001).
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In practice, it may be possible to meet the objectives of standard-
ization while maintaining a degree of product variety, by using
functional specifications as opposed to design specifications that
freeze implementation.
D. Open and Objective Selection of Technology
Standardization activities may give rise to a temptation to
engage in "horse-trading." Members may have invested in a par-
ticular technology or may have an interest in limiting the cost
and time of adapting their product lines to a new standard.
There have been allegations, including in the DVSI case, that
firms obstruct adoption of competing technologies, or strike
deals to support each others' complementary technologies for a
standard.6
Paragraph 169 of the Guidelines states briefly that standards
should be set "in a transparent manner. ' 62 Paragraph 171 of the
Guidelines adds:
In some cases, it would be necessary for the benefit of the
consumers or the economy at large to have only one techno-
logical solution. However, this standard must be set on a
non-discriminatory basis. Ideally, standards should be tech-
nology neutral. In any event, it must be justifiable why one
standard is chosen over another.63
This guidance seems inadequate. To allow full and workable
competition between technologies in the standardization pro-
cess, and to ensure that the benefits of standardization are maxi-
mized so that they outweigh the restriction on innovation, the
selection process of standards should be based on objective, rele-
vant, qualitative, and verifiable criteria. Equal treatment should
be ensured regardless of the origin of the technology. Selection
tests should be conducted in a fair, open, and verifiable manner,
by persons or entities that have no direct interest in the out-
come, with a possibility of appeal to an independent body.
E. Open Access to the Standardization Results and Information
An essential consideration for exemption of a standardiza-
tion arrangement is that the results be publicly available to all
61. ETSI/ DVS1, supra n.33.
62. Guidelines, O.J. C 3/2, at 25, para. 173 (2001).
63. Id. at 25, para. 171.
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who wish to evaluate or implement the standard, as soon as rea-
sonably possible. The Guidelines confirm that "the necessary in-
formation to apply the standard must be available to those wish-
ing to enter the market ... ."64
Therefore, standards organization should publish this infor-
mation and often make it available on its website, or provide ref-
erences to other publicly available sources. Similarly, technology
contributors are required to make their technology available to
all who wish to implement the standard.
No distinction can be made between insiders and outsiders,
contributors and non-contributors.65 An exception can be
made, however, for owners of essential IPRs who refuse to li-
cense these IPRs on FRAND terms and conditions. In patent
pool agreements for standardized technology the EC Commis-
sion has accepted Termination Clauses that permit the pool
members to withhold or terminate licenses from essential IPR
owners who hold up the implementation of the standard.66
The requirement of publication should not be interpreted
as requiring IPR owners whose technology is included in a stan-
dard to place their technology in the public domain. The
Guidelines specify that all that is needed is third-party access "on
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. "67
This leads to some of the thorniest current issues in the
standards world: What IPR disclosure policies are appropriate in
a standards context? Can standards bodies or antitrust authori-
64. Id. at 25, para. 169. See X/Open Group, O.J. L 35/36, (1987); IPR Commission
Communication, COM 92/445, at para. 6.2.1 (1992). This requirement does not apply
to joint R&D that does not have the pretension to create an industry standard, and that
meets the conditions of the Joint R&D Block Exemption. See Commission Regulation
No. 2659/2000, O.J. L 304/7 (2000).
65. When ETSI proposed an ]PR Undertaking that would have allowed ETSI mem-
bers to withhold licenses to other members who refused to sign the Undertaking, the
EC Commission objected to any "general policy or commitment to exclude non-mem-
bers/non-signatories from access to IPRs necessary for manufacturing equipment in
compliance with ETSI standards." It warned that: "[i]t should be clear that any dis-
criminatory treatment by ETSI members vis-A-vis non-members ... could give rise to ad
hoc action under the competition rules." See ETSI Open Letter, supra n.43.
66. See, e.g., Commission Press Release, IP/98/1155 (Dec. 18, 1998); Commission
Press Release, IP/00/1135 (Oct. 9, 2000); see also the FTC decision in the Matter of
Intel Corporation, Docket 9288, U.S. Federal Trade EC Commission Complaint, availa-
ble at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9806/intelfin.cmp.htm and the settlement at http:/
/www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/dO9288intelagreement.htm.
67. Guidelines, OJ. C 3/2, at 25, para. 174 (2001); IPR Commission Communica-
tion, COM 92/445, at para. 6.2.1 (1992).
2002]
180 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:163
ties impose compulsory licenses on members or outsiders?
Should standards bodies avoid technology protected by IPRs?
What are permissible licensing conditions?
F. IPR Policies and Standards
1. Obligations to License as a Condition for SSO Membership
(ETSI IPR Policy)
Most IPR holders are in fact ready to license their IPRs for a
standard because it creates a market for their technology. For
example, members of the Digital Video Broadcasting ("DVB")
consortium undertake in paragraph 14.2 of the Statutes of the
DVB Project that they are:
[ ... ] willing to grant or cause the grant of non-exclusive,
non-transferable, world-wide licenses on fair, reasonable and
non-discriminatory terms and conditions under any [Essen-
tial IPRs which it has the free right to grant or cause the
grant] for use in or [manufacture] of equipment fully com-
plying with such specification to any third party which has or
will submit an equivalent undertaking with respect to any rel-
evant IPRs it may have or obtain with respect to such specifi-
cation."
While this looks like a compulsory license, private groups
like DVB tend to adopt standards by unanimity, and compulsory
licenses are avoided if the IPR owner can object to inclusion of
its technology in a standard. Moreover, the IPR Policy allows for
an "opt-out" under Article 14.3:
A Member shall have the right up until the time of final adop-
tion as a standard by a recognised standards body of a specifi-
cation approved by the Steering Board to declare to the DVB
Steering Board that it will not make available licences under
an IPR that was subject to the undertaking for licensing pur-
suant to article 14.2 above, only in the exceptional circum-
stances that the Member can demonstrate that a major busi-
ness interest will be.seriously jeopardized. 9
Article 81 does not allow a standards body to force members
to make licenses available against their will. In the case concern-
68. See Carter Eltzroth, IPR Policy of the DVB Project, 2001, supplied to the U.S. Dep't
of Justice, for a further description on how the Digital Video Broadcasting ("DVB") IPR
Policy has evolved to include arbitration provisions and the fostering of licensing.
69. See id.
STANDARDS FOR STANDARDS
ing the ETSI IPR Undertaking, ETSI members expressed concern
that "submarine" patents would surface after many years of work
on a standard, allowing the patent owner to block the standard
or charge excessive royalties for standard-compliant products.
In March of 1993, ETSI adopted a draft IPR Undertaking requir-
ing its members to license all technology necessary for a stan-
dard, unless the IPR holder expressly reserved the right not to
license an identified IPR within 180 days from the date the stan-
dard development had begun (this was called a "license by de-
fault" system). Acceptance of the IPR Policy would become a
condition for membership in ETSI, which in turn entailed vari-
ous advantages such as the ability to influence standards and ob-
tain advance information and experience.
A number of information technology ("IT") companies
within ETSI expressed concern about the commercial uncer-
tainty of having to commit to the licensing of unknown IPRs
(even future IPRs) for standards that did not yet exist. They also
complained of the competitive disadvantage they would suffer if
they were excluded from ETSI. In preliminary position, the EC
Commission stated:
The "license by default system" ... an undertaking pursuant to
which IPR holders are deprived of their freedom to decide
whether or not to grant licenses on their existing and future
technology is restrictive of competition: it amounts to a mu-
tual renunciation of gaining competitive advantages thanks to
technical efforts and thereby deprives the participants of the
incentive to develop new technologies [ ... ].
Exemption under Article (81) (3) could not be contemplated
if the lack of information [on the precise technological con-
tent of the standard before the public enquiry stage] makes it
technically unfeasible to identify and withhold IPR. If it is
technically possible, but financially burdensome to carry out
meaningful searches, an exemption under Article (81) (3)
could, however, be contemplated. .....
In this light, ETSI abandoned the IPR Undertaking. The
current version of the IPR policy requires each member of ETSI
to use reasonable endeavors to inform ETSI "timely" of IPRs of
which it becomes aware that are "essential" for an ETSI standard
(i.e., where equipment complying with the standard could not
70. See ETSI Open Letter, supra n.43.
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be made without infringing that IPR).7 This covers not only the
member's own IPR, but also third party IPRs of which the mem-
ber is aware. When an "essential" IPR relating to a particular
standard is notified, ETSI's Director must request the owner to
grant a license on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory
terms.
72
Any ETSI member not wishing to license an IPR in respect
of a standard is required to reconsider and explain its position if
no viable alternative technology is available for the standard that
is blocked by that IPR.v3 It is not, however, forced to license the
IPR. If a third party refuses to license an essential IPR, the Di-
rector of ETSI is requested to review the issue and may coordi-
nate submission of a competition complaint to the EC Commis-
sion by the General Assembly of ETSI (possibly on the basis of
MagilU).7 If this is unsuccessful, the standard will have to be re-
viewed.
2. Should SSOs Avoid IPRs (Collective Boycott)
Because of the possible costs of royalties, the question arises
whether standards bodies should avoid IP-protected technology
altogether. This is a controversial issue especially in the Internet
environment. The World-Wide Web Consortium ("W3C") pro-
posed an IPR Policy in the fall of 2001 that would have allowed
IP owners to charge reasonable and non-discriminatory
("RAND") royalties for technologies incorporated in W3C stan-
dards. Until then, W3C standards were royalty-free.
In April 2002, the W3C backtracked: there was so much
criticism from the open source community that W3C returned to
a goal of "royalty-free" standard. According to Article 2 of the
71. ETSI, ETSI IPR Policy, Annex 6 to the ETSI Rules of Procedure, art. 4.1 (2002)
(stating that there is no obligation to conduct patent searches), available at http://
portal.etsi.org/ directives/directivesApr_2002.pdf.
72. Id. art. 6.1.
73. Id. art. 8.1.
74. The EC Commission granted negative clearance for ETSI's interim IPR policy.
Because the policy no longer contains an element of compulsion, no further issues arise
under Articles 81 or 82. See 1995 O.J. (C 76) 5; Commission of the European Commu-
nities, XXVth Report on Competition Policy 1995, at 131-32 (1995). The new ETSI IPR
Policy follows the principles of the 1992 EC Commission Communication on Standards
and IPRs, which concluded that standards should be withdrawn if essential IPRs were
unavailable and that IPR owners should do their best to disclose the existence of IPRs
timely. It opposed compulsory licensing.
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proposed Royalty-Free Patent Policy (working draft of February
26, 2002):
As a condition of participating in a Working Group, each
W3C Member and invited expert agrees to make any Essential
Claims it controls available on [royalty-free] RF terms, as de-
fined in this policy. With the exception of the provisions of
section 2.2 below, this licensing commitment is binding on
participants for the life of the patents in question, regardless
of changes in participation status or W3C Membership.
Specific patents may be excluded from the RF licensing com-
mitment by a participant who seeks to remain in the Working
Group only if that participant discloses specific patents that
will not be licensed on RF terms within 60 days after the pub-
lication of the Working Group's requirements document. A
participant who excludes patents may continue to participate
in the Working Group.
75
This appears to be a legally binding commitment, and a
condition for further participation in the standards process.
The ETSI IPR Policy case suggests that this could raise problems
under EC competition law if participation in W3C conveys com-
petitive advantages. IPR owners may in fact have an interest in
making their technology available for free, because it expands
their market and thus increases their ability to derive revenues
from derivative services, but that should be a voluntary deci-
76sion.
W3C is possibly dominant in Internet standard setting. A
ban on IPRs and the exercise of power as the Internet SSO to
force royalty-free licensing of IPRs could discourage innovation,
and by limiting the pool of available technologies, might result
in the selection of second-class technology as Internet standards.
EC competition law, to the extent applicable, suggests that the
open source movement should compete on the merits with the
IPR community. A collective decision to boycott IPRs can only
be adopted on objective, relevant, and proportional grounds
(i.e., an evaluation of quality and total cost). Quality includes
75. Available at http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/WD-patent-policy 20020226.
76. In the words of the GNU General Public License of the Open Source Founda-
tion (1991) at para. 7 of Terms and Conditions for Copying, Distribution and Modification, "it
is up to the author/donor to decide if he or she is willing to distribute software through
any other system and a licensee cannot impose that choice." The text of this document
is available at http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html.
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the technology itself as well as the possible benefits of open-
source versus IP based development.77 The cost would include
not only the possible royalties, but also the impact that inclusion
of an IPR protected technology could have on the future availa-
bility of open source technology and the success of the standard.
The open source community exists by virtue of the absence of
IPRs, and assertion of IPRs in this context could cause open
source innovation to grind to a halt.78 It would seem legitimate
for an SSO to take this into account as a cost of including IPRs.
Assuming membership is competitively important, the W3C
should properly reason this decision, and evaluate whether less
restrictive means than a complete boycott are available - for
instance, possibly allowing IPR owners to charge for certain end-
uses that do not hamper the open-source development process.
It would be one thing for an IPR Policy to require those who
actively contribute technology to promise not to charge for that
technology (or to inform the group of possible FRAND terms
within a reasonable deadline), and another to exclude IPR own-
ers altogether from the SSO because another member has pro-
posed a technology on which it appears to have IPRs. A proper
balance might be struck by, and an exemption under Article
81(3) might be available for, an IPR Policy that: (a) requires a
member who actively contributes technology to commit to mak-
ing any essential IPR claimed by it available free of royalties, un-
less within a reasonable deadline the technology is withdrawn or
notice is given that royalties will be charged for certain uses, and
what terms will apply, in which case the choice of technology
may be revisited; (b) arranges for regular reasonable patent
searches; (c) provides for the SSO to request that an IPR owner,
if it is discovered that an IPR was not contributed by that IPR
owner, take a position within a reasonable deadline, with possi-
ble review by courts or antitrust authorities in case a license is
refused and no viable alternative technology is available; or (d)
77. See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm (Oct.
2001), available at http://arxiv.org/ftp/cs/papers/Ol09/0l09077.pdf (suggesting that
open source development benefits from competitive advantage over traditional IP-
based innovation, in that it fosters wide participation in innovation and is more effec-
tive in matching best available human capital to best available information outputs).
78. See id. See also Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, available at
www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/lessig.pdf.
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does not exclude from the SSO a member who does not wish to
contribute its IPR for free.
The questions arise: (a) what to do in cases of incomplete
disclosure, late disclosure, or non-disclosure; (b) in what condi-
tions a compulsory license may be imposed under competition
law; and (c) what are the permissible terms and conditions of
such a compulsory license.
3. SSO Member's Failure to Disclose, and Late IPR Disclosure
The EC Commission is currently investigating whether an
SSO member's late disclosure of patents in a standards environ-
ment could give rise to antitrust liability.79
IPR owners are not always willing or able to provide timely
disclosure of the existence of a potentially essential IPR during
the early stages of the definition of a standard, and may not
timely disclose even after the standard has been defined. This
may be a matter of pure oversight, the simple inability to be
aware of all relevant information within a large, multinational
organization, or a lack of full understanding of the intimate de-
tails of a particular standard, which may be very complex. There
may be legitimate doubt about the scope of a patent claim or its
essentiality for the standard.8" Finally, there are cases of deliber-
ate concealment of patents, which in the United States have led
to the Dell Computer Corp."' and Rambus v. Infineon8 2 cases, as well
79. The brief discussion of this non-public case below is provisional, as no findings
have been made and the case is still in its preliminary stages. The author represents
one of the parties under investigation and has had no access to any facts gathered by
complainants or other parties.
80. The fact that patent application is unpublished may not be objective justifica-
tion to conceal the existence of an application. In that case, the member should at least
announce that an application is pending.
81. 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996). The U.S. Federal Trade Commission ("FrC") found
that Dell had encouraged adoption of. the Video Electronics Standards Association
("VESA") local bus standard, while deliberately concealing the existence of a blocking
patent and actually stating positively that it had no such IPRs. Dell eventually agreed to
a consent decree not to assert its patents.
82. 145 F. Supp. 2d 721 (E.D. Va. 2001). Rambus sued Infineon for patent in-
fringement. Infineon successfully counterclaimed on the basis of fraud, pointing out
that in the early 1990s, Rambus used its membership in the Joint Electron Device Engi-
neering Council ('JEDEC"), which sets industry wide standards for memory chips, to
promote a Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory ("SDRAM") standard while
at the same time amending its patent applications to cover the JEDEC SDRAM specifi-
cations. Rambus' business plan was to breach the JEDEC IPR policy, which requires
declaration of known essential patents, because declaration would likely have resulted
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as to the Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") recent Complaint
against Rambus.8" Not all IPR Policies require disclosure in all
cases. The DVB Project, for instance, requires disclosure only if
a member is unwilling or unable to license on FRAND terms. To
date, no such notices have been given.
If two or more firms conspire to conceal the existence of an
essential patent of which all of them are aware, liability likely
exists under Article 81. The very fact that the parties see a need
to hide the patent suggests that disclosure would have influ-
enced the direction of the standards development. Article 81
applies not only to agreements that have as their "effect" the re-
striction of competition, but also agreements whose "object" is
the "prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the common market." Unless the parties have objective and pro-
portional grounds to agree not to disclose the existence of a pat-
ent, which will be difficult to justify, Article 81 would normally
apply.
In the particular case being investigated, there appears to
be no evidence of collusion or violation of an IPR Policy. The
alleged patent owner eventually disclosed the existence of a pat-
in a different standard designed to avoid the patent. After 1996, Rambus withdrew
from JEDEC, but used a "mole" to obtain further information on the standard develop-
ment. In May 2001, Rambus' infringement claims were rejected, followed by a jury
verdict in favor of Infineon, and an order to pay Infineon's attorney fees to the tune of
$7 million. Rambus was permanently barred from suing Infineon for patent infringe-
ment.
83. Rambus' failure to disclose its patents toJEDEC gave rise to an antitrust Com-
plaint against it filed on June 19, 2002. The FTC alleges in the Complaint that from
late 1991 until June 1996, Rambus participated in the standard setting work of JEDEC,
without making it known to JEDEC or to its members that it was actively working to
develop, and did in fact possess (from April 1996), a patent and several pending patent
applications that involved specific technologies proposed for and ultimately adopted in
the relevant standards. Rambus's very participation in JEDEC, coupled with its failure
to make patent-related disclosures - in violation of JEDEC's own operating rules and
procedures, conveyed a materially false and misleading impression thatJEDEC was not
at risk of adopting standards that Rambus could later claim to infringe upon its patents.
Rambus' anticompetitive scheme further entailed perfecting its patent rights over these
same technologies and then, once the standards had become widely adopted within the
DRAM industry, enforcing such patents worldwide against companies manufacturing
memory products in compliance with the standards. According to a detailed "Notice of
Contemplated Relief" attached to the Complaint, the relief sought by the FTC includes
an order preventing Rambus from enforcing U.S. patents and foreign patents (with
respect to products intended for import into or export from the United States) against
producers and users of SDRAM technology, to the extent such patents derive from
patent applications filed prior to Rambus' withdrawal fromJEDEC. Available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2002/06/rambuscmp.htm.
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ent, initially without identifying it, but indicated that it would
license on FRAND terms. Antitrust liability in these circum-
stances requires a finding of both dominance and abuse.
a. Dominance
Before adoption of a standard, the SSO could normally
modify the specification so as to avoid particular patents as and
when the SSO becomes aware of the patents. This means that at
the moment of the concealment, the IPR owner may not be
dominant and may not be caught by Article 82. This does not,
however, mean that the IPR owner escapes scot-free: even if Ar-
ticle 82 does not apply at the time of the concealment, it may
apply to IPR enforcement following concealment. The more
complex the standard and the more advanced the development
work and implementation, the greater the switching costs for the
SSO and the implementers, and the greater the chance of a find-
ing of dominance, especially after a standard is adopted. The
EC Commission has taken the position that:
A longer term benefit will probably accrue to the manufac-
turer who voluntarily licenses his technology to become a
standard, since his market share will eventually grow signifi-
cantly in respect of the rights for which he receives royalty
payments even if he is no longer the sole manufacturer of the
product itself, and even if the royalty rate which he receives is
less than that which he would have obtained from a licensee
on the open market.8 4
Once a standard is adopted, and the standard is defacto or de
jure mandatory, or standard-compliant products represent more
than 40% of the downstream market, the provider of an essential
patent is likely to be found dominant in its technology market.
If at that stage it enforces or continues to enforce its patent
rights, the question arises whether that constitutes an abuse.
84. See IPR Commission Communication, COM 92/445, at para. 2.1.8 (1992). See
also ETSI Open Letter, supra n.43, stating:
Once an essential technology is included with the agreement of the IPR
holder in a standard, particularly one that is made mandatory pursuant to
Community legislation, the owner of the IPR relating to that technology occu-
pies in most if not all situations a dominant position... vis-t-vis manufacturers
requiring licenses on that IPR in order to be able to participate in the market
for the equipment in question.
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b. Abuse
Of course, no liability can exist if a firm acted in good faith
and, upon late disclosure, decided to take the high road and
license the patent royalty-free. For example, IBM recently
agreed to license royalty-free a late-disclosed patent on the Elec-
tronic Business XML web standard created by a United Nations
("U.N.") organization and by the Organization for the Advance-
ment of Structured Information Standards (OASIS).
On the other end of the spectrum, Article 82 would likely
apply if a dominant firm, who participated in the SSO, were to
enforce an intentionally concealed patent to evict competitors
from a standardized product market or exact excessive royalties
(especially if it is active downstream and raises its rivals' costs in
the process).85 The abuse consists of the enforcement of a domi-
nant upstream position in order to monopolize a downstream
market that would not have been vulnerable to monopolization
but for the patentee's concealment of the essential patent. The
standard was created in reliance on the legitimate expectation
that no essential patent applied, which expectation was in fact
created by the patent owner. This argument is particularly pow-
erful if there is evidence that the SSO members would have de-
signed around the patent had they been aware of it.86 Excessive
pricing may be an additional cause of action under Article 82 (a).
Recent case law of the Court of Justice indicates that a patent
owner would in such circumstances probably be deprived of its
rights to enforce the patent altogether." Although EC law does
85. A question might arise as to whether Article 82 applies to a standard setting
organization ("SSO") member who did not actively lie about its patents, but merely
failed to alert the SSO about their existence. In its complaint against Rambus, the FTC
seems to set a higher standard than in Dell Computer in this regard. While the Dell Com-
puter case made clear that an SSO member must not actively lie about its patents when
asked (Dell Computer certified that it knew of no patent that the standard would vio-
late), Rambus suggests that a member may be found liable under antitrust rules, if it fails
to approach the SSO and inform it of all of its relevant patents and patent applications,
as long as this conduct is not inadvertent.
86. In Rambus, if plaintiff had disclosed its patent and patent applications to the
SSO, such disclosure likely would have impacted the choice of the standard technology,
the terms on which Rambus would later be able to license its patents, or both. The
Complaint also attaches importance to the fact that due to Rambus's conduct, the in-
dustry has become locked in to the standard (patented) technology and could not in-
vent around it to avoid paying royalties to Rambus.
87. See generally Micro Leader Bus. v. Commission, Case T-198/98, [1999] E.C.R. 11-
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not prohibit the creation of a dominant position, the Dell Com-
puter and Rambus cases would likely lead to the same result.
Enforcement of patents that were inadvertently not dis-
closed, or disclosed late but in good faith, should not a priori
constitute an abuse. European antitrust authorities and courts
would, however, review demands for royalties or damages with
skepticism in such a situation, and may refuse damages alto-
gether if there is evidence that the SSO could and would have
avoided the patent had the-patent been disclosed in time. Arti-
cle 82(a) prohibits a dominant firm from "imposing unfair
purchase prices . . . or other unfair trading conditions."
Whether a royalty is "fair" depends not only on the value derived
by the licensee, but also whether the licensees were placed in a
position to avoid or reduce the cost by modifying the standard.
If they were not, and this is attributable to the patent owner's
negligence or inaction, royalties would likely be limited to: (a)
what the licensor would have been able to charge in a competi-
tive environment in the absence of the standard, taking into ac-
count any impact that the absence of the standard would have
had on total demand and on the licensee's market share, if there
is evidence that the standard would have been abandoned; (b)
nothing, or a small amount, if the licensee can prove to a suffi-
cient degree of probability that the standard could and would
have been redesigned to avoid the patent altogether, and would
have achieved the same success; and (c) normal RAND terms if
the patent holder can show to a sufficient degree of probability
that its negligence had no impact on the technology choice.
Patent owners should avoid demands for injunctive relief as
a means to exclude competitors from the market, or to force
prospective licensees to the negotiating table and extract exces-
sive royalties, as this would likely be regarded as an abuse and a
violation of the conditions for exemption of the standard agree-
ment.
It should be noted that competition law is not the only avail-
able cause of action. An SSO or prospective licensee could rely
on other claims, depending on applicable law, including con-
tract or promissory estoppel (or venire contra actum proprium theo-
ries in civil law countries), if an IPR Policy applies, or patent
3989 (suggesting European IPR abuse theory in an appeal from decision to reject Micro
Leader's complaint against Microsoft).
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abuse, unfair competition, and general tort theories (which can
be quite broad in certain European jurisdictions).
4. Incomplete IPR Disclosure by an SSO Member
Even if an IPR is disclosed in time, some patentees do not
identify their patents. It may be, for instance, that the patent
application has not yet been published, in which case the IPR
owner has a legitimate interest in withholding detailed informa-
tion, so as not to jeopardize the patent grant. The difficulty is
that in these circumstances, it is impossible to verify the validity
and relevancy of a patent, or the need to design around it.
Therefore, incomplete disclosure could, in certain cases, have an
impact on competition.
a. Refusal to License an Unidentified Patent
Incomplete disclosure combined with a refusal to license
(or a demand for excessive terms) may be part of a strategy de-
signed to influence the SSO's technology choice. In response to
the incomplete disclosure, the SSO might feel compelled to
modify or withdraw the standard. This could affect competition
to the extent that it (a) results in a lower quality standard; (b)
drives the SSO towards a different technology to which other es-
sential IPRs apply for which implementers have to pay; or (c)
causes the SSO to abandon the standard altogether, thus depriv-
ing consumers of the benefits of standardization. These effects
are particularly offensive if it is later discovered that the patent
does not exist, is invalid, or did not read on the initial standard
design at all.
The problem is that no EC antitrust cause of action is availa-
ble unless the firm is involved in collusion (in which case Article
81 applies), is dominant in a relevant market at the moment of
making the incomplete disclosure (in which case Article 82 ap-
plies), or becomes dominant afterwards (possibly as a result of
the SSO decision to switch to a different technology or abandon
the standard).
An example of a firm using patent disclosures to influence
an SSO's technology choice is the dispute in the late 1990s be-
tween Ericsson and Qualcomm (although in this case the pat-
ents were identified, there may have been justifications, and the
dispute was eventually settled). Qualcomm reportedly
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threatened to use its Code Division Multiple Access ("CDMA")
patents, which it claimed were valid and essential, to block
ETSI's proposed Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
("UMTS") third-generation wireless communications standard.
Qualcomm may have had justification for its position, but it at-
tempted to use its CDMA patent claims to force ETSI towards an
alternative Qualcomm-owned CDMA-based standard.'8
As indicated above, if no cause of action is available under
Articles 81 or 82, an SSO or prospective licensee might still be
able to rely on other claims, including contract or promissory
estoppel, if an IPR Policy applies, or unfair competition and gen-
eral tort theories.
b. Promise to License an Unidentified Patent on
FRAND Terms
Incomplete disclosure combined with a promise to license
on FRAND terms should normally not give rise to liability - un-
less the discloser knows the patent to be invalid or non-essential
and uses the disclosure successfully to influence technology
choice or to torpedo the standard.
As indicated above, incomplete disclosure hampers the
SSO's ability to verify the validity or essentiality of the claimed
patent. This should normally not be a problem. Implementers
who doubt the validity or applicability of the patents, can state
their willingness to pay FRAND for any essential patents owned
by the discloser, invite the latter to identify these patents, and if
it refuses to do so, explain that they believe no royalties are due
in the absence of sufficient information confirming that it in fact
owns any patents reading on Implementations.8 9 The discloser
can respond by bringing suit to collect royalties, in which case it
will have to disclose the patents, and the Implementer can chal-
lenge validity or applicability. The patentee should, however, re-
frain from requesting injunctive relief against Implementers who
challenge the validity or applicability of the patents, or the level
88. The dispute was settled on March 25, 1999. Ericsson bought Qualcomm's ter-
restrial Code Division Multiple Access ("CDMA") wireless infrastructure business with a
royalty-beating cross-license of blocking patents with the right to sublicense, and an
agreement jointly to support a worldwide CDMA standard (with fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory ("FRAND") licensing of essential patents).
89. Licensees who wish to take this approach may wish to pay royalties in escrow,
pending litigation, in order to demonstrate their good faith.
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of the royalty because: (a) it is estopped from demanding an
injunction against an Implementer who has declared that it is
prepared to pay FRAND royalties, because it has publicly stated
that it is willing to license any patents it has on such terms; and
(b) a demand for injunctive relief would raise competition
problems under Articles 82 in a standardized environment, or
breach the conditions for exemption of the standard agreement
(or associated patent pool) under Article 81(3).
Accordingly, the patentee should limit itself to an action for
damages (lost profits). Injunctions to exclude the Implementer
from the market should be permissible only if the Implementer
indicates it will refuse to sign FRAND license agreements regard-
less of a finding of validity and applicability of the patents, or
breaches material provisions.
If one or more Implementers take this approach, the paten-
tee must at some stage make a decision on whether to insist
upon execution of patent licenses. In accordance with Article 82
and the conditions for exemption under Article 81(3), the pat-
entee is obliged to avoid discrimination. It must either require
each and every Implementer to pay a FRAND royalty or relin-
quish the right to royalties altogether. Pursuant to Articles 81 (3)
and 82, as applied in a standardized environment, the patentee
cannot at the same time refrain from enforcing its rights against
certain Implementers while continuing to extract consideration
from others, because this would tilt the playing field.
G. Compulsory Licenses and Standards
If a standardization body and the IPR owner discover a
blocking of an IPR after finalization of a standard, market forces
would normally ensure that a license would be granted. The li-
censor might be tempted to demand a high royalty, but should
take care not to impose excessive terms, as the standard could be
withdrawn. There may be situations, however, where the IPR
owner refuses to license third parties. If so, compulsory licenses
may be available in three circumstances: (a) if the IPR owner is
a member of the SSO, the readiness to license is a condition for
exemption under Article 81 (3) of a standards agreement or pat-
ent pool containing restrictive provisions, even in the absence of
dominance; (b) if the IPR owner is a member of the SSO, the
readiness to license is a condition for exemption of a de facto
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standards arrangements between jointly dominant firms, even in
the absence of any restrictive provisions; and (c) if there are
exceptional circumstances under Article 82, a compulsory li-
cense can be imposed on members or non-members alike, if a
refusal to license results in an abuse of dominance.
1. Third-Party Licensing by SSO Members as a Condition for
Ad Hoc Exemption
Article 81(1) may apply to standardization agreements that
compel compliance or reduce innovation by giving competitors
control over each other's product development.90
If the standards agreement falls under the block exemption
regulation for joint R&D agreements (which requires that the
parties meet certain conditions and that their joint relevant mar-
ket share not exceed 25%), no requirement to license third par-
ties exists.9 '
If the market share is higher or the agreement does not
meet the conditions of the block exemption, a restrictive stan-
dards agreement may still benefit from an individual exemption
under Article 81(3) if it is indispensable to foster technical or
economic progress, provided that it benefits consumers and
does not eliminate competition. The last condition cannot nor-
mally be met without licensing of essential patents to third par-
ties. Standards agreements and patent pools often benefit from
positive feedback mechanisms (network effects) such as inter-
operability or reputation that reinforce the members' market
position. They may eventually displace other technologies, fore-
closing competitors who have no access to the IPRs needed to
implement the standard.92
90. See Guidelines, O.J. C 3/2, at 24, para. 166 (2001).
91. Commission Regulation 2659/2000, O.J. L 304/7 (2000).
92. In X/Open Group, the EC Commission explained that lead time (delay in third
party access) may also result in the elimination of competition. The lead time advan-
tage is:
[ ... ] different in nature from the competitive advantage which the partici-
pants in a research and development project naturally hope to get over their
competitors by offering a new product on the market; they hope that their
new product will result in a demand from users but their competitors are not
prevented from developing a competing product whereas in the present case
non-members wanting to implement the standard cannot do so before the
standard becomes publicly available and, therefore, are placed in a situation of
dependence on the members' definitions and the publication thereof.
O.J. L 35/36, at 40 (1987).
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For this reason, the EC Commission made it very clear in X/
Open Group that a policy of enabling third parties to implement
the specifications was crucial to its ad hoc exemption decision
and it confirmed this in the Guidelines.9" Where blocking IPRs
apply, however, publication of specifications is not enough. This
suggests that to benefit from Article 81(3), participants in a re-
strictive standards agreement may have to agree not only to pub-
lish the specifications, but also to license blocking IPRs on
FRAND terms (unless the joint R&D block exemption is availa-
ble). If the parties want to deviate from this principle, it is up to
them to demonstrate that restrictions on the use of or access to
the standard provide economic benefits that could not be
achieved otherwise.
9 4
Whether third parties would have a direct right of action to
demand a compulsory license is not clear. The EC Commission
and the courts could find the standardization (and the restrictive
provisions) illegal and unenforceable, and the courts may award
damages, but may not be able to impose a positive obligation to
license. The EC Commission cannot compel action, the omis-
sion of which is not in itself an infringement.
95
2. Non-Restrictive Standard Agreement between Jointly
Dominant Firms
Article 81 would normally not apply if the standard is (a)
93. See Guidelines, O.J. C 3/2, at 25, para. 169 (2001).
94. See id. at 24, para. 166.
95. See Ford of Europe Inc. and Ford-Werke Aktiengesellschaft v. Commission,
Joined Cases 228 and 229/82, [1984] E.C.R. 1129 (holding that the EC Commission
cannot force firms to enter into a contract to remedy an infringement of Article 81).
See also Automec Sri v. Commission, Case T-24/90, [1992] E.C.R. 11-2223, para. 52,
[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 431, 472, stating that:
There cannot be held to be any justification for such a restriction on freedom
of contract where several remedies exist for bringing an infringement to an
end .... Consequently, the EC Commission undoubtedly has the power to
find that an infringement exists and to order the parties concerned to bring it
to an end, but it is not for the EC Commission to impose upon the parties its
own choice from among all the various potential courses of action which are
in conformity with the Treaty.
Id. This principle is limited to Article 81, and does not apply to remedies for violation
of Article 82. Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications
Ltd. (ITP) v. Commission, Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743.
If the technology owner is in a dominant position, a compulsory license may be availa-
ble under Article 82. National tort law or unfair competition law may provide addi-
tional relief.
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based on non-discriminatory, open, and transparent procedures;
(b) does not oblige manufacturers to comply with the standard,
or (if compliance is mandatory) is part of a wider agreement to
ensure compatibility of products;96 (c) does not prohibit non-
compliant products; and (d) does not include collective boycott
provisions or per se restrictions of competition. In such a case,
the EC Commission can impose conditions for exemption only if
the standard is so successful that foreclosure effects appear even
in the absence of restrictive provisions.97 The EC Commission
proposes to use a joint dominance test:
Private standardization by jointly dominant companies:
'There will be clearly a point at which the specification of a
private standard by a group of firms that are jointly dominant
is likely to lead to the creation of a defacto industry standard.
The main concern will then be to ensure that these standards
are as open as possible and applied in a clear and non-dis-
criminatory manner. To avoid elimination of competition in
the relevant market(s), access to the standard must be possi-
ble for third parties on fair, reasonable and non-discrimina-
tory terms.
To the extent that private [sic] organizations or groups of
companies set a standard or their proprietary technology be-
comes a de facto standard, then competition will be elimi-
nated if third parties are foreclosed from access to this stan-
dard.O8
The EC Commission may therefore use the last condition of Arti-
cle 81 (3) as a lever to obtain an open licensing policy by success-
ful private standard bodies even in the absence of restrictive pro-
visions.
It is unclear whether third parties would have a direct right
of action to demand a compulsory license, as there is case law
indicating that the EC Commission cannot compel action the
96. Ford [1984] E.C.R. at 1129. This normally applies to standards adopted by rec-
ognized standards bodies based on non-discriminatory, open, and transparent proce-
dures.
97. See, e.g., Commission Press Release, IP/98/353 (Apr. 15, 1998) (stating that the
EC Commission extracted commitment to grant licenses to third parties two years
before introduction of the Advanced Photographic System ("APS"), and long before
the end of its development, as well as a promise to provide know-how and technical
assistance). The APS standard may have failed because of restrictive application of
competition rules, preventing joint branding and joint marketing.
98. Guidelines, O.J. C 3/2, at 25, paras. 174-75 (2001).
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omission of which is not itself an infringement.9" Nevertheless,
where the standard is already implemented in the market and
successful enough to have become a de facto industry standard,
the EC Commission may be able to impose a compulsory license
under the effet utile doctrine, arguing that this is the only effec-
tive way to restore conditions of competition.100 Moreover, a
compulsory license may be available under Article 82.
3. Refusal to License by Dominant Company
As explained, under certain IPR Polices such as ETSI's, if a
third party refuses to license an essential IPR, a competition
complaint may be filed with the EC Commission seeking a com-
pulsory license. Under Article 82, compulsory licenses are availa-
ble only if the IPR owner is in a dominant position, which is
likely to be the case if the IPR is essential. 0 1
Whether technology providers acquire a dominant position
in the market for the supply of technology needed for the imple-
mentation of a standard is a matter of fact, depending on a num-
ber of factors such as: (a) the nature of the standard
(mandatory or not); (b) the degree to which the standard is or
can be expected to be adopted by the market participants; (c)
the level of competition between compliant and non-compliant
products; (d) the number of compliant products incorporating
competitive technology; and (e) the countervailing power of the
users. In most cases, however, suppliers of essential proprietary
technology incorporated in successful standards will be deemed
to have a dominant position.
a. Compulsory Licensing under Magill
In Magill, the Court of Justice held that a compulsory li-
cense can be imposed under Article 82 in exceptional circum-
stances only, in essence, when an intellectual property right is
99. Ford [1984] E.C.R. at 1129.
100. See HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENISE F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION, sec. 40 (6th ed. 2001) (citing extensive case-law). Thus, for in-
stance, the EC Commission is entitled to issue interim measures even though Regula-
tion 17/62 contains no such powers, if such measures are the only way to preserve the
useful effect of a final EC Commission decision. See Camera Care v. Commission, Case
792/79, [1980] E.C.R. 119.
101. SeeIPR Commission Communication, COM 92/445, at para. 2.1.8 (1992). See
also ETSI Open Letter, supra n.43.
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used as an instrument to achieve an abusive result that cannot be
justified by the "specific subject matter" and "essential function"
of the intellectual property right.11 2 This principle should be
carefully applied, especially where standardization is still under
way (in which case the IPR owner may not be found per se domi-
nant). Examples of exceptional situations include the following:
* Discrimination. Article 82(c) prohibits discrimination by
dominant companies. Accordingly, a dominant licensor
cannot withhold a license from certain producers of
standards-compliant products if it has already given a li-
cense to others. A discriminatory refusal may be justified
by objective and proportional considerations, such as a
refusal or inability to pay royalties.
* Withdrawal of license. Dominant firms cannot cut off li-
censes from a competitor with a view to taking over the
latter's position in a downstream market for the stan-
dardized product.'0
* Legitimate reliance. Although there is no direct prece-
dent, Article 82 would likely prohibit a dominant com-
pany from refusing a license if it has through its state-
ments, action, or inaction knowingly induced third par-
ties to make investments in the development of a
standard in legitimate reliance on the future availability
of a license. An example would be a company that gave
and subsequently withdrew a commitment to license a
particular IPR, or a firm that voted for a standard know-
ing that it had a blocking patent without disclosing it.
* Refusal to meet customer demand for a new product. Under
Article 82(b), a dominant company must not limit prod-
uct innovation by depriving customers of a new product
or an existing product with significant new functionality
(e.g., interoperable equipment) for which there is "a spe-
cific, constant, and regular pattern of potential de-
mand." In Magill, the EC Commission decided and the
102. Commission Decision No. 89/205/EEC, O.J. L 78/43 (1989) (Magill). See
Volvo v. Veng, Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, 9; Consorzio Italiano Della Com-
ponenfistica Di Ricambio Per Autoveicoli (CICRA) and Maxicar v. Renault, Case 53/87,
[1988] E.C.R. 6039, paras. 15-16; Micro Leader Bus. v. Commission, Case T-198/98,
[1999] E.C.R. IH-3989.
103. See Commercial Solvents Cop. v. Commission, Joined Cases 6 and 7/73, [1974]
E.C.R. 223; CBEM v. CLT and IPB, Case 311/84, [1985] E.C.R. 3261.
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Court of Justice confirmed that a refusal to license in
such circumstances is an abuse if the effect of the refusal
was to "exclude all competition" on the downstream
market. This may apply, for instance, to blocking an IPR
necessary for an interoperability standard."°4
The "abuse of rights" approach adopted by the court in Ma-
gill would require the balancing of various interests: that of the
user community, that of the competing equipment manufac-
turer, that of the IPR owner (in connection with justification),
and the interest of society at large. There should be no compul-
sory license if improved competition or interoperability does not
outweigh the disadvantage of reduced incentive to innovate.
The EC Commission stated in 1992:
Although it could be argued that consumers would benefit in
the short term if intellectual property rights were compul-
sively licensed to serve as the basis of standards, in the long
term, investment in research and development in the stan-
dardized industrial sectors would dry up within the Commu-
nity. Non-Community entities with extensive research activi-
ties would be encouraged to keep their technology out of
Community markets, while low cost manufacturing centres
outside the Community would benefit from cheap licenses to
use Community technology." '
In Magill, the society's interests in innovation were arguably
not affected, because the program information was a mere by-
product of the main activity and, therefore, a compulsory license
did not discourage the development of the program information
in the future. Similarly, the balance of interests would be against
a compulsory license if: (a) it is possible to meet the objective of
the proposed standard otherwise without prohibitive expense, if,
for instance, the standard can be redesigned without prohibitive
delay or expense; (b) the IPR is not essential for the standard.
This would be the case if there is another technically effective
way to implement the standard, for instance by designing
104. This principle also applies to single-firm standards. The EC Commission is
currently investigating whether to require Microsoft to license certain information nec-
essary for third-party products to interoperate with Microsoft client and workgroup
server operating systems, and middleware. It is argued that by depriving third parties of
this information, the latter are unable to develop interoperating systems with additional
functionality or quality.
105. See IPR Commission Communication, COM 92/445, at para. 5.1.15 (1992).
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around the patent; (c) the benefits of the standard do not out-
weigh the negative impact of compulsory license on innovation;
or (d) the IPR owner has a valid justification to withhold a li-
cense (e.g., insufficient return on investment).
b. The IMS Health Case and the Essential Facility Doctrine
In the recent IMS Health decision, the EC Commission used
the essential facilities doctrine as a basis for a compulsory li-
cense, significantly extending past case law.l06 For the first time,
the EC Commission ordered a compulsory license in the absence
of any indication of abusive conduct. The mere refusal to li-
cense an intellectual property right was considered abusive, al-
though there was no indication that the refusal to license was
instrumental in, or buttressed, another abuse, and the prospec-
tive beneficiaries of the compulsory license merely wanted to
market a copy, without innovation or improvements. The es-
sence of the decision is set out in paragraph 70, which provides
that:
The criteria for the establishment of abuse under Article 82
in cases relating to the exercise of a property right, as further
clarified by the Court in Bronner, are whether (a) the refusal
of access to the facility is likely to eliminate all competition in
the relevant market; (b) such refusal is not capable of being
objectively justified; and (c) the facility itself is indispensable
to carrying on business, inasmuch as there is no actual or po-
tential substitute for existence for that facility. 10 7
There is no reference in this paragraph to there being an
"exceptional situation", as required by the Magill case, for com-
pulsory licensing. It is suggested elsewhere, however, that the
EC Commission does in fact consider the situation exceptional
because of the three factors mentioned above in combination
with the consideration that customers gave input in the develop-
ment of the 1860 Brick Structure, which led to what the decision
finds is a defacto industry standard:
The EC Commission considers that there are 'exceptional cir-
cumstances' in this case within the meaning of the phrase
used by the ECJ in Magill (paragraph 50) read in conjunction
with the Ladbroke and Bronner cases. IMS has created, in
106. See IMS Health, supra n.3
107. Id.
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collaboration with the pharmaceutical industry over a long
period of time, a brick structure which has become the de
facto industry standard for the presentation of regional data
services and which the Frankfurt Court has found is its intel-
lectual property right. IMS is now excluding all competition
from the market for regional data services by refusing, with-
out objective justification, to license this structure to competi-
tors. As clarified in the Ladbroke judgement, there is no re-
quirement for a refusal to supply to prevent the emergence of
a new product in order to be abusive.10 8
Thus, the decision appears to rest on three pillars: (a) that,
as a matter of fact, customers had significant input in the devel-
opment of the 1860 Brick Structure; (b) the 1860 Brick Struc-
ture has become the de facto industry standard; and (c) IMS
Health's competitors cannot compete with IMS Health unless
they are permitted to use the 1860 Brick Structure. The Court of
Justice suspended the EC Commission's decision on the ground
that the argument that a compulsory license could only be
granted if the refusal to grant the license "prevent[s] the appear-
ance of a new product on a market separate from that on which
the undertaking in question is dominant constitutes a serious le-
gal question that merits full consideration by the Court of First
Instance in the main action" (paragraph 105 of the order). 109 If
the EC Commission's approach is eventually upheld, it could be-
come difficult to refuse licenses of essential IPRs, even if the IPR
owner did not participate in the SSO and did not engage in any
abuse, and even if the objective is not to innovate further, but to
market products identical to those already marketed by the IPR
owner. This proposition strikes at the heart of intellectual prop-
erty, and it is questionable whether this is in the public interest.
4. What are FRAND Terms, and How to Resolve
Royalty Disputes
From the perspective of EC competition law, "fair and rea-
sonable terms" mean that the consideration extracted in ex-
change for the license must be justifiable, rational, and not ex-
ploitative. "Non-discriminatory terms" means that all similarly
situated licensees and licensors must have access to the technol-
108. Id. para. 180.
109. Id.
STANDARDS FOR STANDARDS
ogy on the same terms and conditions, so as to enable them to
compete on a level playing field. Deviation from the non-dis-
crimination principle is allowed only if there is an objective justi-
fication and the difference in treatment is proportionate to the
difference in circumstances.
a. Level of Royalties
There is little case law relevant for the question of what level
of royalties would be appropriate. The EC Commission has care-
fully avoided this issue in its compulsory license cases, requiring
the parties to negotiate to reach an agreement.110 Little gui-
dance is found in the case-law relating to Article 82(a), which
prohibits "unfair" pricing, i.e., a royalty so excessive that it bears
no reasonable relation to the economic value of the licensed
.IPR.I1 The Court in United Brands explained that this must be
determined objectively.1 12 There are several methods (some
briefly described below), most of which are not particularly use-
ful in the IPR context. An added complication is that standards
often require access to large packages of essential patents, and
compliance with a standard could become prohibitively expen-
sive if a full royalty were charged for each of them.
113
i. Cost-Based Pricing
A royalty might be based on the historical total fixed and
variable cost of development, production, and marketing of the
technology, however, several difficulties arise. First, it is notori-
ously difficult to calculate the total historical cost of an IPR." 4
110. See IMS Health, supra n.3.
111. Cf General Motors Cont'l NVJ1975] E.C.R. 1367; United Brands Co. v. Commis-
sion, [1978] E.C.R. 207 (stating that EC Commission must prove that the applicants
charged unfair prices). The EC Commission normally passes the burden of primafacie
proof on to the complainant.
112. [1978] E.C.R. 207.
113. The Moving Pictures Experts Group - Licensing Authority ("MPEG-LA")
pool includes more than 300 patents. For further discussion of the economic theory of
the "complements" see Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent
Pools, and Standard Setting 4 (Mar. 2001), available at http://haas.berkeley.edu/-sha-
piro/thicket.pdf.
114. This is even more of a problem if courts or authorities were to attempt to
second-guess historic costs, for instance, by using Forward-Looking Long-Run Average
Incremental Cost ("LRIC") as a basis. LRIC seeks to calculate the replacement cost of
the assets, and attempts to approximate the working of a competitive market where
players cannot simply pass on their historic or embedded costs of technology develop-
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More important, a cost based analysis ignores the value of the
sparks of imagination that may represent the essence of the in-
novation. Cost-based pricing also ignores risk, which is especially
high in sectors relying on expensive R&D. An ex post analysis
ignoring development risk and the value of "inspiration" would
not give the right incentives for innovation.
For these reasons, historic costs or replacement costs are
probably not an appropriate valuation tool for IPRs.11t IPR own-
ers should at least be allowed to allocate the costs (including the
cost of capital) of unsuccessful projects to successful projects in
the same sector, and obtain compensation for the value added
by inspiration. Finally, adjustments should be made, if, as a re-
sult of standardization, the market expands, the price per unit
decreases, and the IPR owner's market share decreases. The ef-
fect of market expansion may be so strong as to make licensing
at a low royalty more attractive than using the IPR to torpedo the
standard.
ii. Same Firm Price Comparison
A second method would be to compare the royalties to
those charged for other IPRs by the same firm in a competitive
environment, and if the differences are appreciable, impose on
the IPR owner the burden tojustify the difference. The compar-
ison must be done on a consistent basis, i.e., involving the same
quality and volumes, and ensuring that the lowest price on which
the comparison is based is not loss-making.1"6 This is, again, dif-
ficult in the case of IPRs, which are by definition unique. Again,
adjustments should be made for the consequences of standardi-
zation.
iii. Market-Based Pricing
The second method is unhelpful if the dominant firm
ment to the user, but must lower prices in response to efficient new entrants. See Com-
mission Communication, O.J. C 843 (1998) (on interconnection pricing in a liberalized
telecommunications market). This system is counterfactual and, therefore, unreliable,
especially in an innovation context. It also discourages further investments.
115. Cf, Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
granted, 503 U.S. 970 (1992), rev'd, 507 U.S. 546 (1993).
116. See, e.g., United Brands, [1978] E.C.R. 207, para. 244. In this case, bananas
were sold at a loss in Ireland for a limited period in order to obtain market access, and
the EC Commission's use of Irish prices as the basis for the comparison was therefore
arbitrary.
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charges similar royalties for all of its IPRs or the transactions are
not comparable. A solution might be to review royalties realized
by other firms for comparable licenses in competitive markets
conditions.' 17 This approach raises the difficulties of using the
second method but, in addition, requires adjustments for vol-
ume, quality differences, product differences, overhead differ-
ences, whether or not the product is standardized, and commer-
cial policy differences.
Some experts believe that rules of thumb can be derived
from industry practice, suggesting that royalties for packages of
essential patents should be no more than, say, 1% per patent
with a maximum of 5% of the sales price of a standard-compliant
product. Others value packages of essential patents at 15% to
25% of the net revenues or net profit derived from the sale of
implementations. The results may differ in different industry
sectors. Royalties should probably be less if the IP is not essen-
tial from the consumer's perspective, if substantial value is ad-
ded, or if the technology is integrated in a system providing a
range of services or functions not covered by the IPR."8
iv. Profit Comparison
Perhaps the most difficult approach is the one suggested by
the United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading. It takes the position
that "[a] n undertaking's prices in a particular market can be re-
garded as excessive if they allow the undertaking to sustain prof-
its higher than it could expect to earn in a competitive mar-
ket."'1 9 This seems to require not only a calculation of profits
(and therefore a comparison of costs and prices as in the first
methhod), but also a consistent comparison between the profits
on the dominated market and a competitive market. This could
be done either by a comparison along the lines of second or
third method, with the difficulties that entails, or a comparison
of the actual profit with the risk-adjusted minimum return on
117. Cf Bodson v. SA Pompes, Case 30/87, [1988] E.C.R. 2479 sec. 31 (discussing "a
comparison between the prices charged by the group of undertakings which hold con-
cessions and prices charged elsewhere").
118. It is for this reason that the Personal Computer ("PC'.') industry refused to pay
MPEG-LA the same amount for Digital Versatile Disc ("DVD") functionality in PCs as
MPEG-LA was able to charge DVD player producers.
119. Assessment of Individual Agreements and Conduct, The Competition Act 1998, Of-
fice of Fair Trading Guidelines, OFT 414, September 1999.
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investment that shareholders require before investing in a busi-
ness serving that market. 120
v. Efficient Component Pricing Rule
The Efficient Component Pricing Rule ("ECPR") was first
adopted in Telecom Corp. of New Zealand Ltd. v. Clear Communica-
tions Ltd. 21  Although originally designed for telecommunica-
tions interconnection pricing, it might be of use in compulsory
licensing for standards. According to the ECPR, the supplier of
a product component should not be forced by government inter-
vention to receive for it less than the price that makes that sup-
plier indifferent as to whether the other components of the final
product are provided by itself or others. At that price level,
there is less risk of discouraging further innovation. Thus, the
royalty could be set at the sum of (a) the marginal cost of provid-
ing the technology (presumably minimal); (b) minus the benefit
derived from the use of the licensed technology in the standard
(the increased opportunity that the IPR owner derives from mar-
ket expansion resulting from standardization, e.g., the expected
revenue increase from sales of compliant products by the IPR
owner itself); (c) plus the opportunity cost to the IPR owner of li-
censing the IPR (lost profits), equal to the revenues from the
next-best use in a non-standardized environment; (d) minus the
marginal cost of the next-best use, to the extent avoided.
This price would normally reward the IPR owner for its in-
novation, and at the same time allows opportunity for licensees
to compete with the licensor on the efficiency and quality of im-
plementation, and the addition of new functionality. If the roy-
alty rate does not cover costs, an adjustment may have to be
made.
120. Id. para. 2.14; Erik Pijnacker Hordijk, Excessive Pricing under E.C. Competition
Law: an Update in the Light of "Dutch Developments", Fordham Corp. Law Inst. 28th An-
nual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, Oct. 26, 2001 (describing
cases recently decided by Dutch Competition Authority ("Nma") relying on WACC cal-
culations).
121. Telecom Corp. of New Zealand Ltd. v. Clear Communications Ltd., [1995] 1
N.Z.L.R. 385. The Efficient Component Pricing Rule ("ECPR") is also known as the
Baumol/Willig rule (after highly regarded industrial economists who developed it) or
the parity rule; see William J. Baumol, Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, Parity
Pricing and Its Critics: A Necessary Condition for Efficiency in the Provision of Bottleneck Services
to Competitors, 14 YALEJ. ON REG. 145 (1997).
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b. Disputes and Injunctive Relief Pending Settlement
The best way to avoid disputes is to invite active competition
for the contribution of technology to a standard. 122 Most Euro-
pean SSOs do not appear to get involved in pricing - although
there are instances of SSOs such as the DVB Project ensuring
that terms and conditions are known before final decisions are
adopted. At the technology selection stage, technologies com-
pete on quality and functionality, and there appears to be no
reason not to allow them to compete on price as well. The SSO
may have some buying power, but at this stage, there is at least
some scope for competition, because the users are not yet locked
in.
Implementers, who doubt the fairness of a proposed royalty
after adoption of a standard, should be able to challenge the
royalty without the risk of being foreclosed from market access
during the challenge. Owners of essential IPRs for defacto or de
jure standards (and, especially those who have committed to
FRAND licensing in order to obtain an exemption under Article
81(3)) should limit themselves to suits for damages and refrain
from requesting injunctive relief against implementers. As ex-
plained above, requests for injunctive relief would be inconsis-
tent with their promise to license. It would also create concerns
under Article 82 - taking into account that the owner of essen-
tial IPRs has disproportional power in a standardized environ-
ment where inter-technology competition is very limited. Pro-
ducers of compliant products have no alternative, and the threat
of injunctive relief would be inconsistent with the principle of
equality of arms. Injunctive relief risks significantly reducing
competition pending the litigation (which may be lengthy as a
result of challenges to the validity and applicability of the pat-
ent), to the detriment of consumers. Injunctions to exclude the
Implementer from the market should therefore be permissible
only if the Implementer indicates it will refuse to sign FRAND
license agreement regardless of a finding of validity and applica-
bility of the patents, or breaches material provisions.
Experience suggests that when deprived of the ability to ob-
tain injunctive relief, IPR owners will normally negotiate so as
not to leave the royalty setting to the vicissitudes of litigation.
122. See Shapiro, supra n.113, at 26.
2002]
206 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:163
c. Cross-Licenses
Essential IPR owners may request cross-licenses as alterna-
tive consideration from implementers who do not wish to pay
royalties. It has been argued in at least one European Union
("EU") standardization dispute that competition law does not al-
low a provision requiring licensees to cross-license the essential
IPR owner and other licensees for free, and that a royalty-free
cross-license to the essential IPR and all other licensees would in
effect prevent or inhibit the creation of a patent pool, because
owners of essential patents who sign the Reciprocal Patent Li-
cense are prevented from charging fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory royalties for their patents.
No antitrust concern arose because in the particular case
the licensees had the alternative of signing a royalty-bearing li-
cense if they wished to avoid the cross-license. In any event, a
licensor of an Essential Patent is not required to license it to
competitors who themselves refuse to make their Essential Pat-
ents available on FRAND terms. 123 If it could not withhold its
license in such circumstances, the latter, if they prevailed, would
be able to take advantage of the standardization to control the
market for Implementations while maintaining barriers to entry.
The cross-license should, however, be limited to essential IPRs,
and not cover additional non-essential improvements (unless a
FRAND royalty-bearing license is made available as an alterna-
tive) 124
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: SOME STANDARDS
FOR STANDARDS
1. Openness. The greater the competitive advantage derived
from participation in standardization, the more open a stan-
dards group must be.
2. No burdensome membership conditions. Especially in the
case of formal standards organizations, no obligations to
share technology or other unreasonably burdensome condi-
tions should be imposed as a condition for membership.
123. See Commission Press Release, IP/98/1155; Commission Press Release, IP/
00/1135.
124. Commission Regulation No. 240/96, art. 2(1)(4), O.J. L 31/2, at 7 (1996)
(discussing possibility of obtaining royalty-bearing grant-back licenses).
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Standard license agreements should be fair for both licen-
sees and licensors.
3. Open access. The results of standardization should be made
generally available to members and outsiders alike, on a
non-discriminatory basis, as soon as reasonably possible.
4. Legitimate objectives. Standards should be avoided unless
necessary for (and reasonably related to) legitimate objec-
tives that qualify as essential requirements.
5. Reduce foreclosure. Especially in the case of manufacturers
controlling large market shares or in the case of defacto or de
jure mandatory standards, standardization must not be exclu-
sive and must not prevent the use of additional technology,
or the development of competing standards.
6. Avoid design specifications. To ensure maximum competi-
tion on quality and product differentiation, standardization
depth (or the fixing of design specifications or freezing of
implementation technology) must be limited to what is in-
dispensable and proportionate in light of the standard's ob-
jective.
7. Fair technology selection procedures. The selection of tech-
nology for a standard should be based on objective, relevant,
qualitative, and verifiable criteria. The total costs of a tech-
nology may be a ground for rejection. Equal treatment
should be ensured regardless of the origin of the technol-
ogy. Selection tests should be conducted in a fair, open, and
verifiable manner, by persons or entities that have no direct
interest in the outcome. There should be a possibility of ap-
peal to an independent body.
8. Limit exchange of information. Exchange of information
should be limited to what is necessary to develop the stan-
dard. Standard antitrust compliance procedures to avoid
spill-over should be implemented.
9. Avoid unnecessary compulsory licenses. Compulsory licens-
ing should be limited to cases where:
(a) the standardization body incurred expenses, legitimately
relying on the expectation, induced by the IPR owner, that a
license would be available on fair reasonable and non-dis-
criminatory terms and conditions; or
(b) the license is necessary for the development of a new
product for which there is "a specific, constant, and regular
pattern of potential demand", which cannot be developed
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without standardization and without access to the IPR, and
where the interests of the IPR owner and innovation do not
outweigh those of standardization.
10. License the results on fair, reasonable, and non-discrimina-
tory terms. If standards are essential for market access, and
IPRs are essential for compliance with the standards, then
the licensors must avoid any of the following potentially abu-
sive licensing practices:
" Discriminating pricing (including bilateral deals between
licensors) for IPRs that are "essential" for compliance
with the standard, thus distorting the level playing field
in the downstream market;
* Cross-subsidisation of activities in the downstream market,
using royalties to gain a competitive advantage;
" Price squeezing by imposition of royalty rates that do not
leave an adequate margin for competitors;
" Excessive royalties for the IPRs; predatory pricing in the
downstream market, and tying of essential IPR to tech-
nology or products that are not essential to comply with
the standard; and
" Litigation to obtain injunctive relief (as opposed to dam-
ages) against non-licensed users of essential IPRs who
have declared a willingness to agree on fair, reasonable
and non-discriminatory terms and conditions, unless the
user is in breach of the license agreement or not in good
faith.
The EC Commission's case-law and practice in the context
of essential facilities suggests that licensors of patents that are
essential for compliance with a de jure or de facto mandatory
should ensure separate accounting for their downstream manu-
facturing of standard-compliant products, so as to be able to
demonstrate that they do not give competitive advantages to
their own manufacturing divisions that they withhold from out-
siders.
